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1. Introduction 
European Parliament (EP) elections have generally 
been described as second-order elections (Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980, 1997). Compared to first-order elections 
- usually national (parliamentary) elections - less is at 
stake in second-order elections as the composition of 
the national government is not being determined. 
Compared to first-order elections, second-order elec-
tions are characterized by (e.g., Reif & Schmitt, 1980): 
(1) lower turnout, (2) higher success rates for fringe 
and new parties, (3) electoral losses for government 
parties, (4) a higher percentage of invalid ballots, (5) is-
sues and actors dominating the electoral campaign 
that are not at stake and do not stand for election, and 
(6) lower media attention. Classifying EP elections as 
second-order has prompted extensive academic atten-
tion, confirming by and large the assumptions of the 
second-order paradigm, ranging from a focus on party 
campaigns and campaign strategies (e.g., de Vreese, 
2009), the coverage of mass media (e.g., Wilke & 
Reinemann, 2007) to—most importantly—the behavior 
of voters (e.g., Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009; Hix & 
Marsh, 2007, 2011).  
There are good reasons, however, to speculate that 
the 2014 EP election was different from previous EP 
elections and therefore does not adhere anymore, or 
at least to a lesser degree, to the characteristics of a 
second-order election. First, the election took place 
during a deep crisis of European integration. As a con-
sequence of the economic and financial crisis starting 
in 2008, the EU underwent what some called a “Euro 
crisis” with Greece at its center. Such a crisis of one of 
the most visible successes of European integration, the 
common currency, was likely to place the 2014 EP elec-
tion high on the political and public agenda. Further-
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more, for the first time ever, most EP party groups 
campaigned with a EU wide candidate for the presi-
dency of the Commission, with the race culminating 
between Junker (Christian Democrats) and Schulz (So-
cial Democrats). These leading candidates had the ob-
jective to run a rather European focused campaign and 
to frequently discuss European issues (e.g., Piedrafita & 
Renman, 2014).1 Therefore, it is important to re-
evaluate the assumptions generated by the second-
order literature for the case of the 2014 EP election 
(see Schmitt, 2005, p. 669).  
This study examines whether voter behavior in the 
2014 EP election is in line with assumptions surround-
ing second-order elections and seeks to answer the 
question if the 2014 election can (still) be described as 
a second-order election, despite a very different con-
text to previous EP elections. First, we examine citi-
zens’ turnout and voting patterns between first- order 
national and second-order EP elections. Second, we 
analyze the motivations for changes in citizens’ elec-
toral behavior between national and EP elections, fo-
cusing in particular on the less-is-at-stake argument 
and on varying political involvement among the elec-
torate. Only by uncovering the motivations behind vot-
ing patterns can we evaluate to what extent the sec-
ond-order election paradigm is (still) valid. Unlike 
previous studies, we draw on a unique online panel 
survey database of Austrian voters surveyed during 
both national and EP election periods. This allows us to 
assess whether citizens indeed behave differently in 
first- versus second-order elections. By doing so, not 
only do we obtain a better insight into the behavior of 
individuals at different types of elections, we are also 
able to extend the literature on second-order elections. 
2. EP Elections as Second-Order 
All elections are equal, but some elections are more 
equal than others, so it appears. When comparing elec-
tions at different levels, the yardstick is most common-
ly the national election, labeled first-order election. 
Other elections at the local, regional or supranational 
level are juxtaposed against this yardstick, and referred 
to as second-order elections (Reif, 1984). The differ-
ences between these and first-order elections are said 
to be wide-ranging: they manifest themselves in the 
party campaigns, the mass media coverage of and the 
voters’ engagement with the campaigns, as well as in 
the polling booths. While previous research has dealt 
with the second-order phenomenon in regard to local 
or regional elections (e.g., McAllister, 2004; Freire, 
2004; Schakel & Jeffery, 2013) in this study the focus is 
on European elections and campaigns.  
In their seminal contribution, Reif and Schmitt 
                                                          
1 See also van der Brug, Gattermann and de Vreese (2016) for 
the uniqueness of the 2014 EP election. 
(1980) provide the basic framework for the second-
order paradigm of EP elections. Based on the conten-
tion that the most important political decisions are 
made in the national political systems, it is argued that 
EP elections have to be viewed as second-order to na-
tional elections. Reif and Schmitt outline five dimen-
sions that characterize second-order elections, of 
which the first, the ‘less at stake dimension’ (p. 9) has 
received most attention and has provided the central 
assumptions most often used when studying second-
order voting behavior (e.g., Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 2005).2 
In short, these assumptions refer to patterns in turnout 
and voting behavior that should be characteristic of EP 
elections, provided they are real second-order elec-
tions. First, because there is less at stake in EP elec-
tions and due to a less politicized campaign, it is pre-
dicted that turnout will be lower in EP elections 
compared to the national level. Second, since govern-
ment parties are in a position in which they may disap-
point voters to a greater extent than opposition par-
ties, it is likely that such dissatisfied voters will use the 
EP election as an easy opportunity to punish govern-
ment parties. This translates into a higher likelihood of 
lower support for government parties in EP elections 
than in the previous national election. Third, it is ar-
gued that voters might cast more sincere ballots in 
elections in which less is at stake, since incentives to 
vote strategically are lower. Strategically it often makes 
more sense to vote for a big party since these have a 
higher likelihood of actually influencing political deci-
sions. This ‘voting with the heart’ rather than ‘voting 
with the head’ phenomenon (Schmitt, 2005, p. 652; 
van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996) would also trans-
late into big parties loosing support in EP elections 
compared to national elections. A supplementary as-
sumption that follows from this is that new and more 
extreme parties in particular would do comparatively 
well at EP elections (Reif, 1984; van der Eijk et al., 
1996).3  
The three central assumptions have been repeated-
ly tested and largely confirmed over the past three 
decades, in particular concerning turnout patterns (e.g. 
Curtice, 1989; Niedermayer, 1990; Reif, 1984).4 In a 
                                                          
2 The other dimensions are ‘specific arena’, ‘institutional-
procedural’, ‘campaign’ and ‘main-arena political change’ (Reif 
& Schmitt, 1980, pp. 10-15). Some of these provide additional 
impetus to the basic postulates of the ‘less at stake’ dimension.  
3 Another important contention in the literature is that the 
electoral cycle matters and patterns differ between countries 
depending on when in the national electoral cycle the EP elec-
tions are held. Since this study looks at voting in a single coun-
try only, we do not further discuss this issue here.  
4 A further contention of the second-order paradigm stretches 
to the wider campaign context. Allegedly, EP elections are 
characterized by little attention from the mass media and less 
active party campaigns. Furthermore, EP election campaigns 
are said to be dominated by national, not European perspec-
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comprehensive contribution after the first four EP elec-
tions, Marsh (1998) finds substantial support for ex-
pected vote choice patterns: government parties as 
well as bigger parties had been losing out in EP elec-
tions. Looking at the 2004 EP elections, Schmitt (2005) 
still finds strong signs for second-order voting through-
out Western European countries, less so in the then 
new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. By 
and large, and in particular in Western countries, turn-
out was lower, government parties were losing and 
small parties were winning in EP elections. In a similar 
vein, Koepke and Ringe (2006) conclude that the ap-
plicability of the second-order framework to the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries would be at least 
questionable. Träger (2015), however, finds that the EP 
election of 2014 was again characterized by strong in-
dications of second-orderness, with low participation 
rates, strong ‘anti-government swings’ and more sup-
port for small and new parties across Europe. 
Such largely aggregate-level perspectives allow for 
speculation about individual differences, while empiri-
cally testing the possible motivations at the individual-
level and gaining insight in differences in voters’ behav-
ior at first- and second-order elections is not possible 
(Schmitt, 2005, is an exception here). Individual-level 
data are needed to further test the theoretical back-
grounds behind the second-order framework (e.g., van 
Aelst & Lefevere, 2012; see also Giebler & Wagner, 
2015, for a more elaborate argumentation).  
Only few studies explicitly consider motivations for 
turnout differences between national and EP elections 
at the individual level. While a vast range of literature 
deals with explanations of turnout in general terms 
(see Blais, 2006), a considerable number has specifical-
ly focused on turnout at EP elections. As with the gen-
eral literature, a distinction is made between macro-
level systemic factors (such as compulsory voting, 
weekend voting etc.; see Mattila, 2003) and micro-level 
motivations. As our analysis is confined to a single 
country context, macro-level factors are not further 
discussed here,5 except for the second-order frame-
work influencing micro-level motivations. Research on 
possible individual-level predictors of turning out in EP 
elections has provided mixed results. It is assumed that 
citizens’ perceptions of the EU polity (for instance trust 
in the EP or the EU in general) function as explanatory 
                                                                                           
tives, thus show strong domestification in terms of issues and 
actors (e.g., Brunsbach, John, & Werner, 2012; Cushion & 
Thomas, 2015; de Vreese, 2003, 2009; Tenscher & Maier, 2009; 
Wilke & Reinemann, 2007). Regarding media campaign cover-
age, it needs to be noted, however, that there are strong cross-
national and cross-media differences and that some have iden-
tified a steady increase in the visibility of EP elections (e.g., 
Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2016). We do not further discuss 
these issues here.  
5 See Hobolt et al. (2009) and Söderlund et al. (2011) for stud-
ies integrating context and individual factors. 
factors for voter turnout. Schmitt and Mannheimer 
(1991) however only find small effects of EU factors, 
while Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson (1997) come to 
the opposite conclusion (see also Flickinger & Studlar, 
2007, for macro-level support).  
While EU attitudes are one plausible motivation for 
turnout at EP elections, it has been argued that in-
volvement and information play an important role as 
well (de Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007; Mattila, 2003). Polit-
ical interest, for instance, has been shown to consist-
ently affect turnout in general (e.g., Denny & Doyle, 
2008) and also in EP elections (van der Eijk & Op-
penhuis, 1990). Söderlund, Wass and Blais (2011) ex-
plicitly address the role of political interest in a second-
order framework. They argue and demonstrate that, as 
EP elections are of low salience, political interest plays 
an even greater role for turnout in EP than in national 
elections. Our analysis continues along those lines by 
additionally focusing on attention to the campaign. 
Even if of low salience generally, individuals’ attentive-
ness to the EP campaign may increase their propensity 
to cast a vote, simply because they are more aware of 
what is going on in the campaign. This may in particular 
be true for the 2014 campaign in which the apparent 
horse race between the two main candidates may have 
motivated people to vote.  
In this study we address three motivations for 
changing voting behavior between national and EP 
elections. Two of these are in line with the second-
order framework, while the third deviates from this 
framework. First, as mentioned above, voters may use 
the EP elections to display their true preferences. Since 
there is something at stake in national elections, voters 
are more inclined to vote strategically, that is for bigger 
parties that are more likely to enter government and 
influence policy. Voters in these elections thus depart 
from their preferences and cast a vote for a party that 
would otherwise not be their first choice. In EP elec-
tions, by contrast, as less is at stake, voters are more 
likely to display their true preference when casting a 
vote. Vote choice is more expressive; voters tend to 
‘vote with their hearts’ (e.g., Carrubba & Timpone, 
2005; Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980). Prior studies have found some empiri-
cal evidence for this assumption on the individual level, 
while at the same time it also appears that sincere, ex-
pressive voting is not the only mechanism at play (Car-
rubba & Timpone, 2005).  
A second motivation (that would lead to a similar 
outcome as the sincere voting assumption discussed 
above) is that voters use the EP election to demon-
strate discontent with national politics, in particular 
the national government (Franklin, van der Eijk, & 
Marsh, 1995; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). Since there 
is apparently little at stake in EP elections, voters may 
use these elections as a kind of referendum to send 
signals of dissatisfaction to the national government. 
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Voters may ‘vote with their boots’ and punish the in-
cumbents without this punishment having much con-
sequence for the composition of the national govern-
ment, thus being a safe opportunity to send signals. 
Again, there is limited support for this assumption at 
the individual-level (e.g., Carrubba & Timpone, 2005).  
The third motivation under study here departs from 
the second-order framework in that it puts voters’ ac-
tual perceptions of EU politics and policies center 
stage. This ‘EU matters’ motivation assumes that vot-
ers have knowledge of what is happening at the EU-
level and take into account which of the parties would 
best represent their perceptions of EU politics when 
casting a vote in EP elections. In this framework we 
should see that vote change should be a function of 
voters’ perceptions of and attitudes towards EU poli-
tics. Studies of voting behavior at EP elections have 
shown that, at least under certain circumstances, the 
EU does indeed matter for voting decisions (Carrubba 
& Timpone, 2005; Heath, McLean, Taylor, & Curtice, 
1999; Hobolt et al. 2009; van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012; 
Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; for conflicting evidence 
see Giebler & Wagner, 2015). As such, EP elections 
cannot only be considered as second-order elections 
any longer. While our study does not address the dif-
ferential strengths of EU attitudes as motivation for 
voting behavior at different elections, we specifically 
look at EU attitudes being a motivation to change one’s 
vote from national to EP elections. We draw on the 
three assumptions discussed here when formulating 
our hypotheses.  
A major shortcoming of prior studies that focus on 
electoral behavior at national and EP elections is that 
their results are based first and foremost on potentially 
incorrect recall questions.6 When survey respondents 
are asked about their electoral behavior for different 
elections in the same survey, it is highly likely that their 
responses are biased because respondents tend to 
harmonize their responses. Our study is different in 
that it employs panel data in which the same individu-
als were probed about their electoral behavior right af-
ter the respective election took place.  
3. Hypotheses 
To test whether the individual vote choice at the 2014 
EP election differed from the voting behavior of the 
same individuals at the previous national election in 
ways that are in line with presumptions from the sec-
ond order literature, we formulate the following hy-
potheses. These are drawn from the host of literature 
reviewed above regarding the patterns of second-order 
as opposed to first-order election behavior. Since we 
can only speculate so far about possible changes 
brought about by the 2014 context, we adhere to for-
                                                          
6 However, for an exception see van Aelst and Lefevere (2012). 
mulating assumptions similar to many prior studies, 
based on observations during past EP elections (e.g., 
Koepke & Ringe, 2006; Marsh, 1998; Schmitt, 2005). 
These will form the basis for the subsequent hypothe-
ses regarding individual motivations for the differences 
in voting behavior. With regard to turnout we expect:  
H1: Voters are more likely to abstain at European 
elections compared to national elections.  
Concerning patters of vote choice we follow prior stud-
ies in differentiating between votes for government 
parties and for bigger parties generally, vis-à-vis votes 
for opposition parties and for smaller parties. Since the 
political configuration in Austria in 2014 makes it im-
possible to distinguish between government and big, 
or opposition and small parties respectively, we refrain 
from formulating two different hypotheses here. The 
two major parties were in a grand coalition, and the 
smaller parties formed the opposition (as has mostly 
been the case in post-war Austria).  
H2a: Voters are more likely to switch vote from a 
(large) government party in the national election to 
a (small) opposition party in the EP election than 
vice versa. 
While the ‘voting with the heart’ thesis would predict 
vote switching from government to opposition parties, 
the ‘voting with the boot’ or protest vote thesis would 
allow for two different patters which are subject of the 
following hypothesis. To protest against the govern-
ment, government supporters at the national election 
could just simply stay home during the EP election. 
Therefore we expect:  
H2b: Voters of (large) government parties at 
national elections are more likely to abstain at the 
European election than voters of (small) opposition 
parties.  
Beyond these comparative aggregate-level hypotheses 
we consider possible motivations of individual voters 
that would explain the differences in electoral behav-
ior. Most of the extant individual-level literature on 
second-order voting focuses on actual vote choice, 
while we take both, motivations for turnout and moti-
vations for vote swings into account. Starting with the 
former we have identified two main factors that may 
explain turnout differences between national and EP 
elections. First, EU attitudes are supposed to matter. In 
line with prior research (Blondel et al., 1997; de Vreese 
& Tobiasen, 2007; Flickinger & Studlar, 2007) we ex-
pect that positive attitudes towards European integra-
tion are positively related to turnout at the EP elec-
tions.  
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H3: Positive attitudes towards European integration 
are positively related to turnout at the EP election.  
Also in line with prior research (de Vreese & Tobiasen, 
2007; Sönderlund et al., 2011) we expect that involve-
ment matters for turnout at EP elections.  
H4: Interest and involvement in politics are 
positively related to turnout at the EP election.  
Our hypotheses of individual level motivations to 
change vote choice relate to the second-order frame-
work in that they address the notions of ‘voting with 
the heart’ versus ‘voting with the boot’ and further-
more consider whether the ‘EU matters’ for vote 
switching. First, we assume that dissatisfaction with 
politics at the level of the nation state would lead vot-
ers to switch from voting for the big, governing parties 
to voting for a smaller, opposition party—they ‘vote 
with their boots’ by largely drawing on national politi-
cal considerations.  
H5: Dissatisfaction with national politics motivates 
those who voted for a (large) government party in 
the national election to vote for a (small) 
opposition party in the EP election.  
An alternative perspective would be that vote switch-
ing between national and EP elections is actually an 
expression of voters’ true preferences. Here we should 
see that voters’ switching behavior can be explained by 
their political predispositions—they tend to vote with 
their heart.  
H6: Vote switching between the national and  
the EP election is motivated by voters’ political 
predispositions.  
Finally, we depart from the second-order framework 
and examine—in line with earlier studies (Carrubba & 
Timpone, 2005; van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012)—whether 
vote switching between national and EP elections can 
be explained by EU policy perceptions and preferences. 
Since we study this motive in the context of second-
order elections, we primarily focus on EU policy prefer-
ences as a motive to switch vote from a bigger gov-
ernment party to a smaller opposition party. We 
should see dissatisfaction with politics on a European 
level as a motivator for voters to switch from the gov-
ernment to opposition parties in general terms. The 
opposition, in particular in the Austrian case of a center 
grand coalition, is diverse. In this case it is more likely 
that voters would not vote for any opposition party, 
but specifically for those opposition parties that take a 
clear anti-European position—thus we should see 
those dissatisfied with EU politics to cast a clear ‘EU 
matters’ vote.  
H7a: Dissatisfaction with European politics 
motivates those who voted for a (large) 
government party in the national election to vote 
for a (small) opposition party in the EP election. 
H7b: Dissatisfaction with European politics 
motivates those who voted for a pro-European 
party in the national election to vote for an anti-
European party in the EP election. 
4. Data and Method 
We test our expectations within Austria, which joined 
the EU in 1995. While Austrian voters were supportive 
of joining the EU in a referendum in 1994 (66.6 per 
cent voted in favor of joining the EU), their overall sup-
port of the European integration process dropped sub-
stantially soon thereafter. Eurobarometer data reveal 
that Austrian citizens were and still are hardly con-
vinced to have benefited from EU membership, and 
support for EU-membership was and still is only slightly 
higher than in the UK. Unsurprisingly, Austria has al-
ways had a number of rather Eurosceptic parties run-
ning in EP-elections, some of them being very success-
ful over the course of the years (e.g. List Hans-Peter 
Martin and FPÖ (Freedom Party), together gained 30.4 
per cent of the vote share in the 2009 EP election). 
Meanwhile, like in most European countries, the main-
stream parties can overall be characterized as being 
pro-European. The two mainstream parties in Austria, 
the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian Demo-
cratic “Austrian People’s Party” (ÖVP), are also gov-
ernment parties, as they have been in a grand coalition 
(again) since 2006.   
For our analyses, we rely on a unique online panel 
study within the Austrian National Election Study 
(AUTNES) which collected data before and after the 
2013 Austrian national election, as well as after the 
2014 EP elections in Austria (Kritzinger et al., 2016). In 
particular, we use wave 4 of the panel study fielded 
immediately after the Austrian national election that 
took place in September 2013, and wave 5 collected in 
the aftermath of the EP elections in May 2014. 2.456 
respondents took part in fourth wave of the online 
panel in 2013, of which 1.222 could be re-interviewed 
after the EP elections in 2014. Hence, the same re-
spondents were interviewed after two different elec-
tions and this avoids the problem of having to rely on 
recall questions about past turnout behavior and vote 
choice which have been shown to be plagued by con-
siderable errors (van der Eijk & Niemöller, 2008; Wal-
dahl & Aardal, 2000; Weir, 1975): most importantly, it 
appears likely that responses with regard to two differ-
ent elections taken in the same survey influence each 
other. In other words, responses about electoral be-
havior at t-1 that are provided at t (where t could be ei-
ther the national, first-order or the second-order EP 
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election and t-1 the respective opposite) might be 
faulty because respondents incorrectly remember their 
voting behavior or because they reflect current prefer-
ences at t. Individual differences identified on the basis 
of such data may therefore be rather hypothetical and 
hardly reflective of differences in real preferences at 
the two time points (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2008; van der 
Eijk & Franklin, 1996). 
We used respondents’ electoral behaviors in 2013 
and 2014 to construct our various dependent variables 
on which the outlined individual motivations on chang-
es in electoral behavior between first- and second-
order elections were then tested. Concerning to turn-
out we came up with four categories of voters, two of 
them indicating change: (1) respondents who ab-
stained from both elections; (2) respondents who par-
ticipated only in the national election; (3) respondents 
that turned out only in EP elections; and (4) those re-
spondents that participated both in the national and 
the EP elections.  
With regard to vote choice, we also constructed 
several categories. First, we examined which party the 
respondent voted for in the national election and then 
created several outcome variables for 2014. Voters 
that took part in the EP elections could switch from (1) 
government parties in national elections to opposition 
parties in EP elections or from (2) opposition parties to 
government parties. The last two categories we coded 
were (3) respondents switching from pro-EU parties in 
national elections to Eurosceptic parties in EP elections 
and (4) respondents switching from Anti-EU parties in 
national elections to Pro-EU parties in EP elections. It 
should be noted that these categories are not exclu-
sive, in that for instance a pro-EU party could also be a 
government party (see the notes below Table 2 for the 
concrete coding of the various parties).  
Turning to the main independent variables, we ex-
amine four types of factors: satisfaction with national 
politics, satisfaction with European politics, political in-
volvement and general political predispositions. First, 
to evaluate citizens’ levels of satisfaction with the na-
tional political system in general and politics in particu-
lar we use three variables. The first one captures re-
spondents’ levels of satisfaction with democracy in 
Austria, the second citizens’ satisfaction with the cur-
rent Austrian government, and for the third, we use re-
spondents’ perception of the economic development 
in Austria over the last 12 months. Satisfaction with Eu-
ropean politics is reflected in four items in total. Paral-
lel to the national level, respondents reported their 
satisfaction with EU democracy, and additionally, we 
include respondents’ satisfaction with political deci-
sions at the EU level. We furthermore probed a general 
assessment of EU integration commonly used in EU 
public opinion studies (European integration should go 
further or has already gone too far) and, given the cri-
sis of European integration in 2014, we also used a 
question on EU solidarity (“In times of crisis Austria 
should financially support EU member states that suf-
fer from economic and financial distress”).  
For the turnout model, we captured political in-
volvement using questions regarding respondents’ at-
tentiveness towards both the national and the EP elec-
tion campaign. Furthermore, for all our models we rely 
on a traditional measure of political interest as an indi-
cator for involvement. Finally, our measure of political 
predisposition is limited to ideological self-placement 
on a left-right scale and to the squared term of this 
measure to consider differential behavior of the ideo-
logical extremes. Eventually, we included a set of con-
trol variables, such as education, age and gender. 
While for our turnout hypotheses we run a multinomi-
nal logit model (in line with current standards we re-
port marginal effects, computed according to the “ob-
served-value-approach”, Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013), for 
the vote choice models we run several binary logit 
models. 
5. Results 
Addressing our first set of hypotheses, we first provide 
some descriptive results on turnout and voting behav-
ior differences at the aggregate-level between the na-
tional and the EP election. Specifically, we examine 
whether and to what extent individuals are more likely 
to turn out at national elections and are more prone to 
vote for small and oppositions parties in EP elections. 
These results confirm our expectations based on the 
second-order framework to some degree (see Figure 
1). Concerning turnout, we find that 24 per cent of the 
respondents voted in the national but not the EP elec-
tion, while only less than two per cent did the reverse 
(differences significant at p < .001). We thus find clear 
indications of second-orderness of EP elections when it 
comes to turnout, supporting H1. When considering 
vote switching from government to opposition parties 
and vice versa, the picture is also quite clear, but 
somewhat less pronounced. Of those who voted for a 
government party at the national election, some 18 per 
cent switched to voting for an opposition party in the 
EP election, while less than ten per cent of those who 
cast a national election vote for an opposition party 
switched to a government party (difference significant 
at p < .001). This provides support for the second-order 
framework as expected in H2a. 
The expectation, however, that those who voted 
for a government party at the national election were 
more likely to abstain in the EP election (H2b) was not 
confirmed. Taking as a baseline all those who cast a 
vote in the national election, only some ten per cent of 
the initial government voters, but 18 per cent of the 
opposition voters did not turn out at the EP election 
(difference significant at p < .001). Voters did not pun-
ish government parties more than opposition parties by 
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Figure 1. Aggregate patterns of changes in voting behavior. 
not turning out, but rather the reverse. Finally, while 
not specifically hypothesized, we find no aggregate-
level evidence of an anti-EU party swing at the Europe-
an election. Of all respondents who cast vote in both 
elections, only some eight per cent switched from a 
pro-EU party vote in the national election to a Euro-
sceptic party vote in the EP election, and another nine 
percent did the reverse (difference non-significant). 
In a second step, we test the motives for different 
behaviors. The first set of analyses relates to turnout 
patterns between first- and second-order elections. In 
these explanatory models of turnout, we consider fac-
tors relating to involvement in politics and EU atti-
tudes. We present the average marginal effects of 
these factors based on our MNL model in Table 1.7 
Starting with EU attitudes, the results show that retro-
spective satisfaction with EU decisions is positively re-
lated to turnout in both national and EP elections. 
Those few who only turned out at EP elections did not 
do so in relation to their EU attitudes. With regard to 
the political involvement variables, political interest is 
not related to turnout, and it is only negatively related 
to no turnout in both elections. Meanwhile, attention 
to the EP campaign is positively related to voting in 
both the national and the EP election and negatively to 
turnout in the general election only. While not explicit-
ly hypothesized, we also find that it is in particular citi-
zens placing themselves in the middle of the left-right 
                                                          
7 See Table A3 in the Appendix for logit coefficients. 
scale that were more likely to turn out only in the gen-
eral election, while citizens placing themselves at the 
edges of the left-right scale are more likely to turn out 
in both elections.8 
Overall, we find some support for the assumption 
that EU attitudes are a motivation for turning out at EP 
elections (H3). Although considering the number of EU 
attitude variables employed in our model, it is striking 
to see that only very few of those factors actually mat-
ter. Nonetheless, it is comforting to see that none of 
our EU attitude variables are related to turnout at na-
tional elections only. Turnout cannot be explained by 
political interest. However, EP campaign attention is a 
strong positive predictor of turnout. We obtain rather 
mixed results for H4. 
The second set of explanatory models considers 
changes in vote choice between the national and the 
EP election for different types of parties (Table 2). In 
line with the second-order framework, we focus on po-
litical predispositions, national protest motives, and, 
additionally, on EU attitudes. The first model, explaining 
vote switching from a (large) government party in the 
national to a (small) opposition party in the EP election, 
is in line with our expectation formulated in H5. Those 
who are discontent with the national government are 
more likely to switch from a government vote in the na-
tional to an opposition vote in the EP election. This we 
                                                          
8 This interpretation is based on illustrations that are available 
on request. 
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Table 1. Average marginal effects. 
 Turnout in No 
Election 
Turnout Only in 
General Election 
Turnout Only 
in EP Election 
Turnout in Both 
Elections 
Age 16 to 29 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.08# 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
Age 30 to 44 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.04# 
(0.02) 
-0.13** 
(0.04) 
Age 45 to 59 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.08# 
(0.04) 
Men 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Education (Matura) -0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.06# 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
Interest in politics -0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Satisfaction with democracy AT -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Satisfaction with democracy EU -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08# 
(0.04) 
Satisfaction with government AT 0.01 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Satisfaction with decisions of EU (past 12 month) -0.08# 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.13* 
(0.05) 
Assessment of European integration -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
AT should support other EU members -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Changes in Economic Situation AT (past 12 month)  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Attentiveness to general election campaign -0.03# 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Attentiveness to EP election campaign -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parentheses; # p<.10, * p<.05 , ** p<.01 , *** p<.001; See Tables A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix for the variable coding; See Table A3 in the Appendix for logit coefficients. 
take as an indication for a ‘vote with the boot’ in EP 
elections, much in line with the second-order frame-
work. Neither ideological self-placement (predisposi-
tion), nor EU attitudes explain switching behavior. Alt-
hough further specifications of vote switching shown in 
model three do provide a somewhat different picture. 
Changing votes from a pro-EU party in the national 
election to a Eurosceptic party is clearly influenced by 
EU attitudes. Dissatisfaction with EU decisions and 
negative assessments of EU integration explain this 
kind of switching behavior. Ideological predispositions 
and protest motives do not play a role here, giving a 
clear indication of an ‘EU matters’ framework (H7b). In 
sum, we identify protest motives as drivers of the typi-
cally postulated anti-government swing in EP elections. 
It is, however, important to specify vote switching be-
havior between certain types of parties in order to get 
at EU driven motives for differences in vote choice. It 
appears relevant to further specify the kind of party 
voters turn to when turning their back on the party 
they voted for in the national election. 
Concerning vote switching, political predispositions 
and EU attitudes act as opposing drivers of the second-
order framework (second and fourth model). Those at 
the ideological center with rather positive EU attitudes 
are more likely to switch from voting for an opposition 
or Eurosceptic party in the national, to a government 
party or a pro-EU party in the EP elections. With regard 
to H6, we find that political predispositions do not in-
fluence vote switches as predicted by the second-order 
framework, but rather in the opposite direction. Of the 
control variables, only one consistent finding is note-
worthy. It is in particularly the young that tend to 
switch votes to (smaller) Eurosceptic opposition par-
ties. Overall the models perform quite well, with R-
Square values between .23 and .56.  
In sum, we find only partial evidence for our hy-
potheses in the data. Table 3 summarizes the findings 
presented above. As shown, slightly more than half our 
expectations, which were formulated in line with the 
second-order literature, found support, while we find 
only weak evidence in support of, or had to reject the 
other hypotheses. This suggests that the second-order 
phenomenon might at least not apply similarly in all cas-
es, and that individual-level data are useful to specify 
and thoroughly investigate general assumptions.  
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Table 2. Binary logit models explaining patterns in vote choice. 
 Gov. to Opp. Opp. to Gov.1 Pro-EU to Anti-EU2 Anti-EU to Pro-EU 
Age 16 to 29 1.62** 
(0.60) 
-0.58 
(0.63) 
1.35* 
(0.57) 
1.62 
(0.99) 
Age 30 to 44 0.84 
(0.54) 
0.10 
(0.50) 
1.14* 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.64) 
Age 45 to 59 0.50 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.47) 
0.41 
(0.45) 
0.12 
(0.59) 
Men -0.49 
(0.36) 
-0.58# 
(0.35) 
0.26 
(0.35) 
0.12 
(0.48) 
Education (Matura) -0.24 
(0.38) 
0.51 
(0.39) 
-0.73* 
(0.36) 
1.33** 
(0.47) 
Interest in politics -0.29 
(0.40) 
0.45 
(0.43) 
0.09 
(0.41) 
-0.70 
(0.52) 
Left-right 2.37 
(2.92) 
8.67* 
(3.69) 
-0.68 
(2.74) 
11.05* 
(4.57) 
Left-right² -2.91 
(3.32) 
-6.99# 
(3.70) 
0.41 
(3.20) 
-14.06** 
(4.84) 
Satisfaction with democracy AT 0.59 
(0.46) 
0.53 
(0.38) 
-0.05 
(0.38) 
-0.38 
(0.52) 
Satisfaction with democracy EU -0.16 
(0.43) 
1.37** 
(0.42) 
-0.43 
(0.40) 
1.02 
(0.65) 
Satisfaction with government AT -1.45** 
(0.51) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
-1.05 
(0.65) 
-1.66# 
(0.92) 
Satisfaction with decisions of EU (past 12 month) -0.40 
(0.45) 
0.30 
(0.40) 
-0.85# 
(0.45) 
1.93* 
(0.85) 
Assessment of European integration -0.05 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.17* 
(0.07) 
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
AT should support other EU members -0.13 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
-0.03 
(0.26) 
Changes in Economic Situation AT (past 12 month)  -0.24 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.30 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.35) 
Constant -1.23 
(0.92) 
-5.93*** 
(1.18) 
-0.84 
(0.85) 
-4.44** 
(1.56) 
N 223 407 394 231 
Cragg-Uhler R² 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.56 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; 1 Government parties = SPÖ, ÖVP; Opposition 
parties = FPÖ, Greens, NEOS; 2 Pro-EU parties = SPÖ, ÖVP, Greens, NEOS, Piraten; Anti-EU parties = FPÖ, BZÖ, Europa An-
ders, REKOS, EUStop; See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for the variable coding. 
Table 3. Electoral behavior at EP election compared to national election: Hypotheses. 
Turnout 
Abstention more likely in EP elections H1  
…EU support increases turnout at EP elections H3  
…interest and involvement increases turnout at EP elections H4 ≈ 
Abstention more likely amongst voters of (large) government parties H2b  
Vote Change 
Vote switch from (large) government party to (small) opposition party H2a  
…increases with dissatisfaction with national politics H5  
…increases with dissatisfaction with European politics H7a  
…is based on ideological predispositions H6  
Vote switch from pro-European party to Eurosceptic party increases with dissatisfaction 
with European politics 
H7b  
 
6. Discussion 
This study set out to test the second order elections 
framework (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) in the context of the 
most recent 2014 EP election in Austria. The different 
context of this election gave rise to speculations to 
what degree the second-order framework would still 
apply. Notably, and in addition to considering whether 
voting patterns would be in line with the second-order 
framework, our study addresses the motivation for an 
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individual’s differential voting behavior at national ver-
sus EP elections. By and large, we still find indications 
of the second-order framework regarding the 2014 EP 
elections. On the aggregate-level, we indeed see that 
citizens were less inclined to turn out at the EP election 
than at the national election, and that there is a ten-
dency towards an anti-government swing (Marsh, 
1998). Thus, our findings confirm the basic assump-
tions of the second-order framework, namely that 
people defect and that they rather vote for (smaller) 
opposition parties than for the (bigger) government 
parties. These aggregate-level findings are in line with 
Träger (2015) who provides evidence across EU mem-
ber states that points into a similar direction for the 
2014 election (see also Freire & Pereira, 2015, for the 
Portuguese case). 
In a second step, we consider whether individuals’ 
motivations for second-order voting are also in line 
with the assumptions from the general framework. We 
find that to be the case in particular for vote switching 
from government to opposition parties, which appears 
to be strongly driven by discontent with the national 
government. It is therefore not the case that voters re-
frain from strategic votes for big parties and rather ‘go 
with their hearts’ along their political predispositions, 
but rather that small opposition parties win, because 
people ‘vote with their boots’, as they want to punish 
the incumbent (e.g. van der Eijk et al., 1996). Only fur-
ther specifications of the vote switch between the na-
tional and EP election give some indication for an ‘EU 
matters’ framework on the one hand, and for a ‘voting 
with the heart’ on the other. When considering vote 
switches from rather pro-EU or government parties in 
national elections to anti-EU or populist parties in the 
EP elections, we see a clear influence of EU attitudes as 
a motivation. Furthermore, and rather to our surprise, 
political predispositions in the form of ideology mat-
tered only for vote switches that were in contrast to 
what the second-order framework would postulate. In 
sum, when considering the general assumptions of the 
second-order framework, we only find the motive of 
protest to stand out for vote switching.  
Concerning turnout patterns, we see a role of both, 
political involvement and EU attitudes, with those pay-
ing attention to politics and those with positive EU atti-
tudes being more likely to turn out at EP elections, or 
less likely to abstain after having voted in national elec-
tions. Involvement seems to play a considerable role as 
well. This is somewhat in line with Söderlund et al. 
(2011) who suggest a strong role for political involve-
ment in explaining second-order election turnout. Con-
cerning both turnout and vote choice patters, we see 
that further specifying the basic postulates of the sec-
ond-order framework to certain parties was important 
for finding at least some support for an ‘EU matters’ 
framework. In sum, we find indications of second-order 
voting and these are driven by political involvement 
regarding turnout, and by protest regarding vote 
switches. Our results give little reason to doubt that 
the second-order framework persisted to be applicable 
to the 2014 EP election, at least in Austria.  
A real asset of our study is the database it draws 
upon. Using survey responses from a panel in which 
the same individuals were probed directly following 
the national and the EP election is a clear improvement 
compared to the designs of many prior studies that re-
lied on either macro-level analysis or hypothetical sur-
vey questions regarding vote choice in a far-away elec-
tion. While Austria is a good case to study the second-
order framework, being a rather typical European mul-
tiparty system, one problem remains. Austria was ruled 
by a grand coalition comprised of the country’s two 
major parties in 2014 when the EP election was held. 
Therefore, our study of the second-order framework 
was not able to distinguish between government and 
large parties on the one hand, and opposition and 
small parties on the other. Our analysis of vote choice 
is a combination of both, and we are thus not able to 
see whether large vs. small party voting would be mo-
tivated by something else than protest.  
Furthermore, Marsh (1998) has shown that second-
order voting patterns were more pronounced in coun-
tries in which government alternation was the norm, 
rather than the exception. Austria, however, is charac-
terized by strong stability in terms of government. This 
may be an explanation why the patterns we identified 
were present, but not dramatic. One can speculate that 
the findings would be more pronounced in other coun-
tries where governments are more likely to change 
from one national election to the next. Another point 
worthy of stressing here is that our study explicitly 
aimed at studying patters of changes in voting behavior 
between national and EP elections and the motivations 
for such changes. Therefore, we do not attempt to an-
swer the question whether EU attitudes were more 
important as a predictor of vote choice for certain par-
ties at EP elections compared to national elections, but 
merely whether they mattered for changing the vote. 
Extensions of our study to other times and contexts 
should make sure that identical vote choice models can 
be built to address this question.  
A final limitation relates to the fact that we could 
not empirically address the question whether the 2014 
EP election was more or less second-order compared to 
previous elections. Overall, the findings are in line with 
expectations derived from the framework, and there-
fore we conclude that the Austrian EP election 2014 
still had clear signs of second-orderness despite an 
economic crisis at center stage and a strongly personal-
ized campaign.  
Acknowledgments 
This research is conducted under the auspices of the 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 130-144 140 
Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), a National 
Research Network (NFN) sponsored by the Austrian 
Science Fund (FWF) (S10902-G11). We are grateful to 
Johann Gründl for his research assistance as well as the 
two anonymous referees for helpful comments. All au-
thors contributed equally, authorship is in alphabetical 
order. 
Conflict of Interests 
The authors declare no conflict of interests. 
References  
Blais, A. (2006). What affects voter turnout? Annual Re-
view of Political Science, 9, 111-125. 
Blondel, J., Sinnott, R., & Svensson, P. (1997). Represen-
tation and voter participation. European Journal of 
Political Research, 32(2), 243-272. 
Boomgaarden, H. G., & de Vreese, C. H. (2016). Do Euro-
pean elections create a European public sphere? In 
W. van der Brug & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), 
(Un)intended consequences of European Parliament 
elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Brunsbach, S., John, S., & Werner, A. (2012). The supply 
side of second-order elections: Comparing German 
national and European election manifestos. German 
Politics, 21(1), 91-115. 
Carrubba, C., & Timpone, R. J. (2005). Explaining vote 
switching across first- and second-order elections ev-
idence from Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 
38(3), 260-281. 
Clark, N., & Rohrschneider, R. (2009). Second-Order 
Elections versus First-Order Thinking: How Voters 
Perceive the Representation Process in a Mul-
ti-Layered System of Governance. Journal of Europe-
an Integration, 31(5), 645-664. 
Curtice, J. (1989). The 1989 European Election: Protest 
or green tide? Electoral Studies, 8(3), 217-230. 
Cushion, S., & Thomas, R. (2015). Reporting different 
second order elections: A comparative analysis of the 
2009 and 2013 local and EU elections on public and 
commercial UK television news bulletins. British Poli-
tics. doi:10.1057/bp.2015.26 
De Vreese, C. H. (2003). Television reporting of second-
order elections. Journalism Studies, 4(2), 183-198. 
De Vreese, C. H. (2009). Second-rate election campaign-
ing? An analysis of campaign styles in European par-
liamentary elections. Journal of Political Marketing, 
8(1), 7-19. 
De Vreese, C., & Tobiasen, M. (2007). Conflict and identi-
ty: Explaining turnout and anti-integrationist voting 
in the Danish 2004 elections for the European Par-
liament. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(1), 87-114. 
Denny, K., & Doyle, O. (2008). Political interest, cognitive 
ability and personality: Determinants of voter turn-
out in Britain. British Journal of Political Science, 
38(2), 291-310. 
Flickinger, R. S., & Studlar, D. T. (2007). One Europe, 
many electorates? Models of turnout in European 
Parliament elections after 2004. Comparative Politi-
cal Studies, 40(4), 383-404. 
Franklin, M. N., & Wlezien, C. (1997). The responsive 
public issue salience, policy change, and preferences 
for European unification. Journal of Theoretical Poli-
tics, 9(3), 347-363. 
Franklin, M. N., van der Eijk, C., & Marsh, M. (1995). Ref-
erendum outcomes and trust in government: Public 
support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht. West 
European Politics, 18(3), 101-117. 
Freire, A. (2004). Second-order elections and electoral 
cycles in democratic Portugal. South European Socie-
ty and Politics, 9(3), 54-79. 
Freire, A., & Pereira, J. S. (2015). More second-order 
than ever? The 2014 European Election in Portugal. 
South European Society and Politics, 20(3), 381-401.  
Giebler, H., & Wagner, A. (2015). Contrasting first- and 
second-order electoral behaviour: determinants of 
individual party choice in European and German fed-
eral elections. German Politics, 24(1), 46-66. 
Hanmer, M. J., & Kalkan, K. O. (2013). Behind the curve: 
Clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted 
probabilities and marginal effects from limited de-
pendent variable models. American Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 57(1), 263-277. 
Heath, A., McLean, I., Taylor, B., & Curtice, J. (1999). Be-
tween first and second order: A comparison of voting 
behaviour in European and local elections in Britain. 
European Journal of Political Research, 35(3), 389-414. 
Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2007). Punishment or protest? Un-
derstanding European parliament elections. Journal 
of Politics, 69(2), 495-510. 
Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2011). Second-order effects plus 
pan-European political swings: An analysis of Euro-
pean Parliament elections across time. Electoral 
Studies, 30(1), 4-15. 
Hobolt, S. B., Spoon, J. J., & Tilley, J. (2009). A vote 
against Europe? Explaining defection at the 1999 and 
2004 European Parliament elections. British Journal 
of Political Science, 39(1), 93-115. 
Koepke, J. R., & Ringe, N. (2006). The second-order elec-
tion model in an enlarged Europe. European Union 
Politics, 7(3), 321-346. 
Kritzinger, S., Johann, D., Glantschnigg, C., Aicholzer, J., 
Glinitzer, K., Thomas, K., & Wagner, M. (2016). AUT-
NES Online Panel Study. GESIS Data Archive.  
Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the second-order election 
model after four European elections. British Journal 
of Political Science, 28(4), 591-607. 
Marsh, M. & Mikhaylov, S. (2008). European Parliament 
elections as second order national elections: A re-
view of the evidence. Retrieved from http://europe 
angovernance.livingreviews.org 
Mattila, M. (2003). Why bother? Determinants of turn-
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 130-144 141 
out in the European elections. Electoral studies, 
22(3), 449-468. 
McAllister, L. (2004). Steady state or second order? The 
2003 elections to the National Assembly for Wales. 
The Political Quarterly, 75(1), 73-82. 
Niedermayer, O. (1990). Turnout in the European Elec-
tions. Electoral Studies, 9, 45-50. 
Piedrafita, S., & Renman, V. (2014). The ‘personalisation’ 
of the European Elections: A half-hearted attempt to 
increase turnout and democratic legitimacy? (EPIN 
Papers, 37). Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies. 
Reif, K. (1984). National electoral cycles and European 
elections 1979 and 1984. Electoral Studies, 3(3), 244-
255. 
Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine second-order national 
elections: A conceptual framework for the analysis of 
European election results. European Journal of Politi-
cal Research, 8(1), 3-44. 
Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1997). Second-order elections. 
European Journal of Political Research, 31(1/2), 109-
124. 
Schakel, A. H., & Jeffery, C. (2013). Are regional elections 
really ‘second-order’ elections? Regional Studies, 
47(3), 323-341. 
Schmitt, H. (2005). The European Parliament Elections of 
June 2004: Still second-order? West European Poli-
tics, 28(3), 650-679. 
Schmitt, H., & Mannheimer, R. (1991). About voting and 
non-voting in the European elections of June 1989. 
European Journal of Political Research, 19(1), 31-54. 
Söderlund, P., Wass, H., & Blais, A. (2011). The impact of 
motivational and contextual factors on turnout in 
first-and second-order elections. Electoral studies, 
30(4), 689-699. 
Tenscher, J., & Maier, M. (2009). European Parliamen-
tary elections 2004: Studies on political campaigning 
and media framing of a second-order event. Journal 
of Political Marketing, 8(1), 1-6.  
Träger, H. (2015). Die Europawahl 2014 als second-order 
election. In Die Europawahl 2014 (pp. 33-44). Wies-
baden: Springer Fachmedien. 
Van Aelst, P., & Lefevere, J. (2012). Has Europe got any-
thing to do with the European elections? A study on 
split-ticket voting in the Belgian regional and Euro-
pean elections of 2009. European Union Politics, 
13(1), 3-25. 
Van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. N. (1996). Choosing Eu-
rope? The European electorate and national politics 
in the face of union. Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M., & Marsh, M. (1996). What 
voters teach us about Europe-wide elections: What 
Europe-wide elections teach us about voters. Elec-
toral Studies, 15(2), 149-166. 
Van der Eijk, C., & Niemöller, B. (2008). Recall accuracy 
and its determinants. In: K. Arzheimer & J. Evans 
(eds.), Electoral Behavior. Debates and Methodology 
(pp. 232-280). Los Angeles: Sage.  
Van der Eijk, C., & Oppenhuis, E. (1990). Turnout and 
second-order effects in the European elections of 
June 1989: Evidence from the Netherlands. Acta Po-
litica, 25, 67-94. 
Waldahl, R., & Aardal, B. (2000). The accuracy of recalled 
previous voting: evidence from the Norwegian elec-
tion study. Scandinavian Political Studies, 23(4), 373-
389. 
Weir, B. T. (1975). The distortion of voter recall. Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science, 19(1), 53-62.  
Wilke, J., & Reinemann, C. (2007). Invisible second-order 
campaigns? A longitudinal study of the coverage of 
the European Parliamentary elections 1979–2004 in 
four German quality newspapers. Communications, 
32(3), 299-322. 
About the Authors 
 
Dr. Hajo Boomgaarden 
Hajo Boomgaarden is Professor of Methods in the Social Sciences with a focus on Text Analysis at the 
University of Vienna He held positions as Assistant and Associate Professor for Political Communica-
tion at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research and the Department of Communication at 
the University of Amsterdam. His research focuses broadly on political communication, with an em-
phasis on media and European integration, media and populist, extreme right parties, election cam-
paigns and advancements of computerized methods of text analysis with multimedia analysis. 
 
Dr. David Johann 
David Johann is Senior Research Associate in the Department of Methods in the Social Sciences at the 
University of Vienna and a core team member of the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). In 
addition, he is Post-Doctoral Research Associate at the German Centre for Research on Higher Educa-
tion and Science Studies (DZHW). David Johann completed his PhD in Political Science at the Universi-
ty of Vienna. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 130-144 142 
 
Dr. Sylvia Kritzinger 
Sylvia Kritzinger is Professor and Head of the Department of Methods in the Social Sciences at the Uni-
versity of Vienna. She obtained her PhD in Political Science at the University of Vienna and then held 
post-doc and visiting positions at Trinity College Dublin, Institute for Advanced Studies and Vienna Uni-
versity. Her research focuses on political behavior and electoral research, democratic representation 
and political participation, and quantitative methods in the social sciences. She is one of the principal 
investigators of the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) being responsible for the Demand Side. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 130-144 143 
Appendix 
Table A1. Dependent variables descriptives. 
Dependent Variables n Scale % 
Turnout1 1218 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7.64 
24.30 
1.64 
66.42 
Vote Choice: 2 Opposition to Government 
 
479 
 
0 
1 
86.43 
13.57 
Vote Choice: Government to Opposition 
 
272 
 
0 
1 
74.26 
25.74 
Vote Choice: Pro-EU to Anti-EU 
 
475 
 
0 
1 
87.37 
12.63 
Vote Choice: Anti-EU to Pro-EU 
 
269 
 
0 
1 
74.35 
25.65 
Note: 1Turnout: 1=abstaining from both elections (n=93); 2=participating only in the national election (n=296); 
3=participating only in EP elections (n=20); 4=participating both in the national and the EP elections (n=809); 2For all vote 
choice variables: 0=staying with the same party as in the national election; 1=switching to a different party.  
Table A2. Independent variables descriptives. 
Independent variables n mean SD min max 
Age 16 to 29 1222 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Age 30 to 44 1222 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Age 45 to 59 1222 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Men 1222 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Education (Matura) 1214 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Interest in politics 1216 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Left-right 1075 0.48 0.21 0 1 
Left-right² 1075 0.27 0.21 0 1 
Satisfaction with democracy AT 1187 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Satisfaction with democracy EU 1155 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Satisfaction with government AT 1181 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Satisfaction with decisions of EU (past 12 month) 1123 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Assessment of European integration 1141 4.15 3.01 0 10 
AT should support other EU members 1189 -0.42 1.12 -2 2 
Changes in Economic Situation AT (past 12 month)  1197 -0.59 0.92 -2 2 
Attentiveness to general election campaign 1018 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Attentiveness to EP election campaign 1220 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Note: The exact question wording for all variables can be found in the AUTNES codebook on www.autnes.at 
 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 130-144 144 
Table A3. Multinomial logit model explaining turnout (Baseline category: Turnout in No Election). 
 Turnout Only in 
General Election 
Turnout Only in EP 
Election 
Turnout in Both 
Elections 
Age 16 to 29 -0.15 1.19 -0.97 
 (0.73) (1.45) (0.70) 
Age 30 to 44 -0.06 1.51 -0.71 
 (0.58) (1.23) (0.54) 
Age 45 to 59 -0.40 0.50 -0.75 
 (0.55) (1.21) (0.51) 
Men -0.46 -0.47 0.01 
 (0.36) (0.65) (0.34) 
Education (Matura) 0.43 0.63 0.98** 
 (0.40) (0.68) (0.38) 
Interest in politics 0.89* 0.34 0.84* 
 (0.44) (0.78) (0.41) 
Left-right 1.29 -1.62 -3.66 
 (3.41) (5.43) (3.11) 
Left-right² -0.83 -0.60 3.48 
 (3.03) (5.65) (2.77) 
Satisfaction with democracy AT 0.29 0.54 0.42 
 (0.40) (0.74) (0.38) 
Satisfaction with democracy EU 0.42 1.10 0.86 
 (0.56) (0.86) (0.53) 
Satisfaction with government AT 0.20 -0.82 -0.24 
 (0.65) (1.26) (0.63) 
Satisfaction with decisions of EU (past 12 month) 1.17 0.66 1.68* 
 (0.84) (1.18) (0.81) 
Assessment of European integration 0.00 0.10 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) 
AT should support other EU members -0.05 0.06 0.04 
 (0.21) (0.35) (0.19) 
Changes in Economic Situation AT (past 12 month)  -0.14 -1.11* -0.22 
 (0.23) (0.46) (0.21) 
Attentiveness to general election campaign 0.78# 0.23 0.65 
 (0.44) (0.77) (0.41) 
Attentiveness to EP election campaign -0.60 0.78 0.86* 
 (0.43) (0.72) (0.39) 
Constant -0.09 -3.53# 1.39 
 (1.16) (1.98) (1.07) 
N 763   
Cragg-Uhler R² 0.28   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; # p<.10, * p<.05 , ** p<.01 , *** p<.001. 
